Regulating the Militia Well: Evaluating Choices for State and Municipal Regulators Post-\u3cem\u3eHeller\u3c/em\u3e by Weissman, Benjamin H.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 82 Issue 6 Article 26 
2014 
Regulating the Militia Well: Evaluating Choices for State and 
Municipal Regulators Post-Heller 
Benjamin H. Weissman 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Benjamin H. Weissman, Regulating the Militia Well: Evaluating Choices for State and Municipal Regulators 
Post-Heller, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 3481 (2014). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol82/iss6/26 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 3481 
REGULATING THE MILITIA WELL:  
EVALUATING CHOICES FOR STATE AND 
MUNICIPAL REGULATORS POST-HELLER 
Benjamin H. Weissman* 
 
Until its 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. 
Supreme Court had never struck down any firearm restrictions as violating 
the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  In Heller, the majority 
held that the Second Amendment’s text and original public meaning protect 
an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home.  
Both proponents and opponents of gun control regulation saw the Heller 
decision as ushering in a new era of Second Amendment jurisprudence. 
On the one hand, Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the majority in 
Heller was seen as a vindication of an inherent natural right that had been 
obscured for too long.  On the other hand, many see the Heller decision as 
having few consequences (besides at the margins) for “America’s already 
weak gun control regime.”  Until the Supreme Court offers more guidance 
on how far the Second Amendment right extends outside the home for self-
defense, it is the lower courts that will ultimately decide how and to what 
extent that right may be restricted by government regulation.  According to 
several commentators, in the years since Heller and McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, lower courts have shied away from invalidating any current 
restrictions besides total bans similar to the ones at issue in those decisions. 
This Note will examine how the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and 
McDonald have affected state and municipal attempts to regulate the 
possession and use of firearms.  In the wake of those decisions, lower courts 
have developed several loose frameworks for evaluating challenges to 
firearm restrictions. Given this confusing judicial landscape, scholars and 
commentators offer competing views of what that landscape means for the 
choices that state and local regulators can and should make.  This Note will 
ultimately evaluate these views in light of the developments and trends in 
recent case law. 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.S.F.S., 2009, Georgetown 
University.  The author wishes to thank Professor George W. Conk for his insight and 
guidance throughout the writing process. 
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“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”1 
“Our thoughts and prayers are with the students and families impacted by 
yesterday’s terrible tragedy in Centennial, Colorado, and with every one 
of the 90 families that lose loved ones in our nation every day to gun 
violence.  We will continue to fight for the solutions we know exist to 
make this the safer nation we all want and deserve, on behalf of every 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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victim and every American who knows that, when it comes to protecting 
our children, we can do better than this.”2 
“Dec. 14 is the anniversary of the horrendous Newtown shooting, but 
despite the best efforts of opportunistic politicians, Americans show little 
sympathy for proposals to tighten restrictions on guns.”3 
INTRODUCTION 
Since at least the eighteenth century, state and local governments have 
placed restrictions on the possession and use of firearms.4  Until its decision 
in District of Columbia v. Heller5 in 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court had 
never struck down any of these restrictions as violating the Second 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.6  In fact, for most of the twentieth 
century, courts had consistently held that the Second Amendment only 
protected a right to keep and bear arms in connection with a state militia,7 
and that the Second Amendment only circumscribed federal rather than 
state conduct.8  In Heller, the majority held that the Second Amendment’s 
text and original public meaning protect an individual’s right to keep and 
bear arms for self-defense.9  Two years later, the Court held in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago10 that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment right against the states, 
so that states and local governments were also barred from infringing the 
right to keep and bear arms.11  Both proponents and opponents of gun 
control regulation saw the Heller decision as ushering in a new era of 
Second Amendment jurisprudence.12 
 
 2. Dan Gross, Brady Campaign Statement on One Year After Newtown, Colorado 
School Shooting, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Dec. 14, 2013), 
http://www.bradycampaign.org/?q=brady-campaign-statement-on-one-year-after-newtown-
colorado-school-shooting. 
 3. Americans Simply Not Interested in Gun Control, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR 
LEGIS. ACTION (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/in-the-news/2013/
12/americans-simply-not-interested-in-gun-control.aspx. 
 4. See infra Part I.C. 
 5. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 6. See Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1412–13 (2009). 
 7. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second 
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 708 (2012). 
 8. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.  Most courts had held that the Second 
Amendment was not incorporated against the states through either the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 9. See 554 U.S. at 628–29. 
 10. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 11. See id. at 3050.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:  
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 12. Compare Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 
2008), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books/defense-looseness (“[Heller] was the most 
noteworthy of the Court’s recent term.  It is questionable in both method and result, and it is 
evidence that the Supreme Court, in deciding constitutional cases, exercises a freewheeling 
discretion strongly flavored with ideology.”), with Randy E. Barnett, News Flash:  The 
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On one hand, Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Heller 
was seen as a vindication of an inherent natural right that had been obscured 
for too long.13  Before the decision, only the Fifth Circuit had held that the 
Second Amendment guaranteed an individual the right to keep and bear 
arms unconnected to militia service.14  Most other courts agreed that the 
Second Amendment guaranteed only a so-called “collective” right to keep 
and bear arms in connection with militia service.15  Thus, the Heller 
decision can be seen as the culmination of decades of scholarly and political 
persuasion to revise courts’ notions of the contours of the Second 
Amendment.16 
On the other hand, many see the Heller decision as having few 
consequences (besides at the margins) for “America’s already weak gun 
control regime.”17  Until the Supreme Court offers more guidance on how 
far the Second Amendment right extends outside the home for self-defense, 
the lower courts will ultimately decide how and to what extent that right 
may be restricted by government regulation.18  According to several 
commentators, in the years since Heller and McDonald, lower courts have 
shied away from invalidating any current restrictions besides total bans 
similar to the ones at issue in those decisions.19 
While lower courts and academics debate the scope of this constitutional 
right, the problem of gun violence remains.20  There is a wealth of scholarly 
 
Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 (applauding the Heller 
decision as “historic in its implications and exemplary in its reasoning”). 
 13. See David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense:  Heller’s Lesson for the 
World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 235–36 (2008) (applauding the Heller decision for 
affirming that the Second Amendment merely “codified a pre-existing right” to keep and 
bear arms for self-defense). 
 14. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the Lower Courts, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 2035, 2037 (2008) (citing United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 15. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Second 
Amendment affords only a collective right to own or possess guns or other firearms . . . .”), 
abrogated by Heller, 554 U.S. 570; Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710–11 
(7th Cir. 1999) (same), abrogated by Heller, 554 U.S. 570. 
 16. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 708 (describing how courts began to “take notice” of 
the “large outpouring of scholarly literature”). 
 17. Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich, The Scholarly Landscape Since Heller, in THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL:  CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 
383, 389 (Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013) (citing Adam Winkler, The 
Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms After D.C. v. Heller:  Heller’s Catch-22, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2009)). 
 18. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 706 (“It is in the application of [Heller and McDonald] 
that ‘the Second Amendment rubber meets the road’ and the actual impact of these 
constitutional issues on Americans’ lives will be determined.” (quoting United States v. 
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring)). 
 19. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 706–07 (“The lower courts, frustrated by the 
indeterminacy of historical inquiry and puzzled by the categorizations suggested by Justice 
Scalia, have . . . effectively embraced the sort of interest-balancing approach . . . in a way 
that is highly deferential to legislative determinations and that leads to all but the most 
drastic restrictions on guns being upheld.”). 
 20. See generally About Gun Violence, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://www.bradycampaign.org/?q=about-gun-violence (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (“On 
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analysis on how courts should proceed with challenges brought under the 
newly incorporated Second Amendment.21  There is, however, much less of 
a focus on the opportunities and challenges that this new jurisprudence has 
wrought for state and local regulators seeking to combat gun violence in 
their jurisdictions.22 
This Note will examine how the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and 
McDonald have affected state and municipal attempts to regulate the 
possession and use of firearms.  In the wake of those decisions, lower courts 
have developed several loose frameworks for evaluating challenges to 
firearm restrictions.23  Given this confusing judicial landscape, scholars and 
commentators offer competing views of what that landscape means for the 
choices that state and local regulators can and should make.  This Note 
evaluates these views in light of how case law has developed recently. 
This Note begins by examining the Second Amendment’s history and the 
recent Supreme Court decisions.  Part I describes generally the history of 
the Second Amendment and its adoption as part of the Bill of Rights.  This 
Part next examines Second Amendment jurisprudence and different 
interpretations of the scope and content of the protections it affords 
individual citizens.  It then provides an overview of the decisions in District 
of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago.  Part I concludes 
by presenting a framework based primarily on the work of Eugene Volokh 
for analyzing and categorizing different regulatory choices for restricting 
possession and ownership of firearms. 
Part II provides an overview of how lower courts have evaluated 
challenges to firearm restrictions in the wake of Heller and McDonald.  
Next it identifies and explains competing characterizations of this 
landscape.  In particular, Part II focuses on Allen Rostron’s argument that 
courts are engaging in interest balancing that effectively defers to the 
government and, Nicholas Johnson’s argument that the “common use” 
standard from Heller is particularly vulnerable to manipulation by courts to 
uphold questionable restrictions. 
Part III evaluates the competing accounts against recent case law.  This 
Part identifies where each of the accounts has proven most accurate.  Part 
III ultimately concludes that while Johnson’s “common use” standard is 
 
average, 32 Americans are murdered with guns every day . . . 140 are treated for a gun 
assault in an emergency room . . . 51 people kill themselves with a firearm, and 45 people 
are shot or killed in an accident with a gun.”). 
 21. See generally Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 17 (surveying the academic 
landscape since Heller and McDonald). 
 22. See, e.g., Louis M. Wasserman, Gun Control on College and University Campuses 
in the Wake of District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 19 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2011) (discussing how public colleges and universities can navigate the 
post-Heller landscape to best fashion constitutional gun control policies on their campuses); 
see also Allen Rostron, Protecting Gun Rights and Improving Gun Control After District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 383, 412–17 (2009) (arguing that Heller, by 
removing the option of total bans from gun regulators’ arsenal of policy choices, may 
actually make it easier to pass gun control laws that fall short of a total ban). 
 23. See infra Part II. 
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being applied by simple restrictions against clearly dangerous and unusual 
weapons, courts engage in interest balancing once the challenge is less 
easily decided. 
I.  THE SECOND AMENDMENT:  HISTORY UP THROUGH HELLER 
This Part begins by providing a brief history of the adoption of the 
Second Amendment as part of the Bill of Rights during the first Congress.  
This Part then briefly describes the main competing views of the protections 
afforded to individuals by the Second Amendment.  Next, this Part 
discusses the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in District of Columbia v. 
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, which provided an answer to the 
question of whether the Second Amendment confers an individual right to 
firearms.  This Part concludes by providing a framework for analysis of 
regulatory choices that focuses both on the type of restriction and the legal 
justification for the government’s authority to effect that restriction. 
A.  The Second Amendment:  History and Interpretation 
This section attempts to provide a brief history of the enactment of the 
Second Amendment.  Because the majority opinion in Heller placed so 
much emphasis on a historical inquiry into the purpose and understanding 
of the Second Amendment at the time of its enactment,24 this section 
provides a basic background narrative.  It is important to note, however, 
that the history of the right to keep and bear arms in the United States is far 
from settled. 
First, many disagree as to the utility of the search for a clear and 
comprehensive narrative of how the Second Amendment was understood at 
the time of its adoption.  Some, like Justice Scalia, find clear answers from 
certain texts and historical sources.25  Yet others struggle with the value and 
implications of the various conflicting historical accounts.26 
Second, assuming there is one overarching story to be found in the 
Amendment’s history, the content of that story has been hotly debated for 
 
 24. See infra Part I.B. 
 25. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584–85 (2008) (finding that 
“[i]t is clear . . . that ‘bear arms’ did not refer only to carrying a weapon in an organized 
military unit,” based on, inter alia, “[n]ine state constitutional provisions written in the 18th 
century or the first two decades of the 19th, which enshrined a right of citizens to ‘bear arms 
in defense of themselves and the state’ or ‘bear arms in defense of himself and the state’”); 
BRIAN DOHERTY, GUN CONTROL ON TRIAL:  INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT BATTLE OVER THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT 2 (2008) (“If Madison, a leading Federalist, openly explained that one 
of the reasons Anti-Federalists had little reason to fear the new government created by the 
Constitution was Americans’ unaltered right to possess guns, it’s hard to see how anyone 
could deny that that liberty was an understood natural possession of Americans among the 
people who wrote and ratified the Second Amendment.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012) (acknowledging that 
while the Court’s historical analysis in Heller is binding, conclusions from historical 
evidence about the scope of the right are at least “debatable”); Rostron, supra note 7, at 732 
(discussing the history of excluding convicted felons from the right to keep and bear arms 
and finding that “[t]he historical evidence simply is too easy to spin in either direction”). 
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several decades.27  Some find that the political and legal history of the 
Amendment’s enactment clearly indicate that it protected only the states’ 
right to maintain and arm their militias.28  Others find that the 
Amendment’s history clearly points in the opposite direction, asserting that 
the Bill of Rights and its Second Amendment guaranteed individual private 
citizens protection from being disarmed by the federal government.29 
These competing accounts shape how the Second Amendment is now 
understood in courts and in legislatures and, notwithstanding their disparate 
implications, are essential for understanding the scope of authority of state 
and local governments to regulate that right. 
1.  Constitutional Convention and the Bill of Rights 
Concerns about external and internal threats to the new republic 
dominated the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia.30  Many political 
leaders feared that unrest would lead different groups to rebel, causing the 
United States to descend into anarchy.31  Delegates also perceived external 
threats from Native American attacks, British troops on the frontier, and 
Spanish troops along the Mississippi River.32  These threats to the fledgling 
nation placed the questions of control over the state militias and creation of 
a standing army at the forefront of the constitutional debate.33 
Many delegates embraced the new nationalist ideal of a strong and 
centralized standing army as the primary national defense.34  Rather than 
relying solely on the well-regulated state militias that had struggled against 
the British army in the U.S. Revolutionary War, these delegates advocated 
for some combination of a standing national army, increased federal control 
over state militias, or the creation of an “elite” militia drawn from the state 
militias.35 
 
 27. See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship:  A 
Primer, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY 1, 1–2 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000) 
(pointing out that the first scholarly article to champion the “individual rights” position did 
not appear until 1960). 
 28. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”:  The Second Amendment in 
Historical Perspective, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY, supra note 27, at 
117, 146 (“The Amendment was not a suicide clause allowing revolutionaries to create 
private militias with which to otherthrow [sic] the national government or even to impede the 
faithful execution of the law; it prevented Congress from abolishing the organized, well-
regulated militias of the states.”). 
 29. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED:  THE EVOLUTION OF 
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 57 (2013) (“In 1791, the American federal Bill of Rights was 
ratified, in part, as a formal recognition that private individuals would never be disarmed.”). 
 30. See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA:  THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 39–41 (2006). 
 31. See id. at 39.  Shays’ Rebellion, led by “debt-ridden farmers,” was fresh in the minds 
of many delegates, as was the perceived threat to order from slaves in the South. See id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. at 40. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id.; see also id. at 48 (discussing the Federalist argument during ratification that 
“it was unwise to put too great a reliance on the militia, a misplaced faith that nearly ‘lost us 
our independence’”). 
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A minority of delegates, however, feared the implications of this 
nationalist agenda.36  These Anti-Federalists argued that state control over 
the militias was essential for keeping the national government from 
growing too strong.37  The creation of a national standing army would 
necessarily threaten the states’ ability to protect their citizens’ individual 
liberties.38 
Though dominated by Federalists pushing for stronger national control, 
the convention ultimately compromised and gave the federal government 
the authority to organize, arm, discipline, and “call forth the aid” of the 
militia, while reserving for the states control over the training and 
leadership of their militias.39  Some delegates, including Virginia’s George 
Mason, advocated adding a declaration of rights to the framework of the 
Constitution.40  This declaration was rejected, at least in part because a 
majority of delegates felt that a national government of limited, enumerated 
powers made it redundant and unnecessary to protect rights that the national 
government of limited powers could not infringe in the first place.41 
The convention sent its proposed Constitution to the Continental 
Congress, who approved it without amendment and sent it to the states for 
ratification.42  Opposition to ratification centered mainly around the failure 
to include a bill of enumerated rights and the lack of a ban on creation of a 
national standing army.43  The Federalist response to these criticisms was 
simple:  “The people and the states retained all powers not delegated to the 
new government” including any to be included in a bill of rights, and a 
standing army was necessary for national defense and would be controlled 
by a fully representative government.44  The Anti-Federalists tied the 
importance of the militias to concerns about federalism:  without sufficient 
control over their militias, states would be subject to the control of an 
 
 36. See id. at 40. 
 37. See id. (“Opponents of the nationalist agenda feared that if state authority over the 
militia were undermined and the federal government were given the ability to raise a 
standing army, there would be no way to check the designs of ambitious and corrupt 
rulers.”). 
 38. See id. (“If history had taught any lesson to these Americans, it was that if power 
was unchecked, it inevitably led to despotism.”). 
 39. See id. at 43.  “In so doing, the convention made the militia a creature of both the 
states and the new national government.” Id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. at 43–44.  Cornell also suggests that because the Constitution could always 
be amended in the future, the addition of a declaration of rights was not seen as crucial at 
this stage. See id. at 44 (“Others may have been too worn out to take up the issue and were 
confident the document could easily be amended at a future date if necessary.”).  Finkelman, 
however, argues that the rights to be protected in Mason’s proposal were rejected by the 
Federalist majority as attempts to limit the national government described in the original 
document rather than simply declaring protected individual liberties. See Finkelman, supra 
note 28, at 143–44. 
 42. See CORNELL, supra note 30, at 44. 
 43. See id. at 45. 
 44. Id. 
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oppressive national government.45  The persistence and popularity of Anti-
Federalist concerns forced Federalists to refine their conception of the role 
of the militias in the United States, eventually conceding the importance of 
the militia as the “bulwark against tyranny.”46 
After ratification of the new Constitution in 1789, the Anti-Federalists 
began to push instead for amendments to the Constitution as a way of 
limiting the power of the new federal government.47  The Bill of Rights that 
James Madison eventually proposed to the first Congress, however, 
included none of the structural changes that the Anti-Federalists hoped 
would restrict the federal government’s newly ratified power.48  Madison’s 
proposed amendments concerned those individual rights and civil liberties 
most commonly associated with a modern understanding of the Bill of 
Rights.49 
The Second Amendment, along with the other first ten amendments, 
arose out of this conflict between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists 
over the nature of the nascent federal government.50  Where before, the 
right to keep and bear arms was tied to the exercise of militia service, the 
Constitutional Convention placed the right squarely in the center of a larger 
debate about federalism and state rights.51 
In crafting the Constitution, the Framers divided the responsibility for 
military protection among the president, Congress, and state governments.52  
The provisions in Article I and Article II provided for two layers of military 
protection, a national army governed and executed by Congress and the 
president, and state militias organized under state law but ultimately subject 
 
 45. See id. at 46 (“Without their militias to protect them, the states would be at the 
mercy of a strong government, which would soon consolidate all power within its orbit.”). 
 46. Id. at 47. 
 47. See CORNELL, supra note 30, at 51 (“Still seething over their defeat, the Anti-
Federalist minority resolved to take their appeal directly to the people.”); Finkelman, supra 
note 28, at 120. But see HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 82 (describing the Bill of Rights as an 
“acknowledgement of the conditions under which the state conventions ratified the 
Constitution, and in response to popular demand for a written declaration of individual 
freedoms”). 
 48. See Finkelman, supra note 28, at 121.  Finkelman points out that 
[t]he fact that the majority of anti-Federalist proposals were structural, rather than 
libertarian, underscores the fact that the most prominent anti-Federalists were only 
marginally interested in a bill of rights. . . .  Once the Constitution was ratified, . . . 
they were no longer interested in a bill of rights and instead wanted a wholesale 
restructuring of the Constitution. 
 Id. at 123. But see HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 70 (“[T]he Federalist[s argued] that a Bill 
of Rights was unnecessary because the proposed government had no positive grant of power 
to deprive individuals of rights, and the anti-Federalist[s] conten[ded] that a formal 
declaration would enhance protection of those rights.”). 
 49. See Finkelman, supra note 28, at 121–22. 
 50. See id. at 124–25. 
 51. See CORNELL, supra note 30, at 41 (“The debate over the federal constitution would 
change [the model of the right to bear arms] as the arguments over [its] meaning . . . became 
embroiled in the larger dispute over federalism.”). 
 52. See Finkelman, supra note 28, at 124. 
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to regulation by Congress and the president.53  The Anti-Federalists were 
most concerned about the potential for a standing national army to threaten 
the people’s liberty.54  The Federalist-dominated convention ultimately 
rejected Anti-Federalist proposals that would have weakened federal 
authority over military protection.55  The Anti-Federalists instead published 
their Reasons of Dissent that contained fourteen proposed amendments to 
the newly ratified Constitution.56  The seventh proposed amendment would 
have protected an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for self-defense 
and hunting and not to be disarmed unless dangerous to others or convicted 
of a crime, and would have prevented Congress from maintaining a 
standing army during peace time.57  The eighth proposed amendment would 
have protected an individual’s right to hunt and fish on his property and all 
other unenclosed lands.58  The eleventh proposed amendment provided that 
states would retain the power of organizing, arming, and disciplining the 
militia and that Congress could only call to action state militias with the 
state’s consent.59 
 
 53. See id. (“[T]he defense of the United States would rely on both the state militias and 
the standing army.”). 
 54. See id. at 125 (“According to the traditional Whig and Republican ideology of the 
period, a ‘standing army’ threatened the liberties of a free people.  This argument was rooted 
in English history, where the army was traditionally a remote mercenary force, disconnected 
from the people, and under the direct control of a hereditary monarch.”). 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. at 126.  Finkelman argues that because many of these proposed amendments 
were eventually adopted almost verbatim, the changes that Madison and the Federalists 
made to the right to keep and bear arms are significant. See id. (“It is of utmost significance, 
. . . that unlike other aspects of the Pennsylvania proposals that had been incorporated into 
the Bill of Rights, on [the issues of the army, the militia, the right to bear arms, and the right 
to hunt,] Madison and his colleagues in the First Congress emphatically rejected the goals 
and the language of the Pennsylvania anti-Federalists.”). 
 57. See id. The seventh proposed amendment read: 
  That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and 
their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law 
shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes 
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals; and as standing armies 
in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that 
the military shall be kept under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil 
powers. 
Id. 
 58. See id. at 127.  The eighth proposed amendment read: 
  The inhabitants of the several states shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in 
seasonable times, on the lands they hold, and on all other lands in the United States 
not enclosed, and in like manner to fish in all navigable waters, and others not 
private property, without being restrained therein by the laws to be passed by the 
legislature of the United States. 
Id. 
 59. See id.  The eleventh proposed amendment read, in two separate paragraphs: 
  That the power of organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia (the manner 
of disciplining the militia to be prescribed by Congress) remain with the individual 
states, and that Congress shall not have authority to call or march any of the militia 
out of their own state, without the consent of such state, and for such length of 
time only as such state shall agree. 
  . . . . 
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Taken together, these proposed amendments would have significantly 
weakened the federal government’s ability to respond to rebellion and 
invasion.60  On the other hand, the Anti-Federalists believed that the 
creation of a standing army without these protections would allow the 
federal government to disarm the state militias, which would significantly 
endanger individual liberty.61 
The Bill of Rights that Madison ultimately proposed to Congress 
preserved the structure and power of the federal government as 
contemplated by the Constitution.62  The rights enumerated and protected in 
the Bill of Rights, then, can be seen as “clarifying the meaning of the 
Constitution and not fundamentally changing its nature.”63  Especially 
given Shays’ Rebellion and the fear of other armed insurrections, Madison 
and the Federalists who dominated Congress would have been loathe to 
diminish the power of the federal government by adopting such a broad 
right to keep and bear arms as proposed by the Anti-Federalists.64  The 
Anti-Federalists, for their part, feared that the federal government would 
nationalize the state militias to infringe upon individual liberties or that the 
federal government would disband them altogether.65 
The debates in Congress over the Second Amendment began with 
Madison’s first proposed text: 
 A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the 
best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall be 
compelled to bear arms.66 
 
  That the sovereignty, freedom, and independency of the several states shall be 
retained, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this constitution 
expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled. 
Id.  Finkelman argues that reading these two paragraphs together “underscores the 
connection many anti-Federalists saw between state sovereignty and the control of the state 
militia.” Id. 
 60. See id.  Finkelman notes that 
one of the primary reasons for calling the Constitutional Convention was the fear 
that without a stronger central government the new nation would be unstable, 
militarily weak, and might not survive . . . .  The kind of amendments the 
Pennsylvania minority wanted would have undermined these powers and the new 
government itself. 
Id. 
 61. See HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 74. 
 62. See Finkelman, supra note 28, at 130. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 131 (“[I]t would have been out of character for the [First] Congress, 
dominated as it was by supporters of the new Constitution, to cripple the new government’s 
ability to control dangerous, musket-toting elements of the population like Daniel Shays.”). 
But see HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 80 (arguing that the Second Amendment was adopted 
to allay fears about federal control over a standing army and the militias, by guaranteeing 
“the revolutionary ideal” that every man be armed with a gun). 
 65. See Finkelman, supra note 28, at 137–39. 
 66. Id. at 139. 
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Debates in the House of Representatives focused mainly on the last clause 
that provided a religious exemption from militia service.67  Nevertheless, 
the House passed an amendment very close to Madison’s original proposal, 
adding only the words “in person” at the end of the last clause.68  The 
Senate, however, rejected many proposed amendments that resembled the 
proposed amendments to the Constitution in the Reasons for Dissent that 
would prevent Congress from maintaining a standing army and significantly 
weaken the federal government’s control over state militias.69  Before 
adopting the final text as it would be included in the final Bill of Rights, the 
Senate removed the clauses that provided for a religious exemption from 
militia service and the definition of the militia as the “body of the 
people.”70 
2.  Individual Right Theory Versus Collective Right Theory 
This section provides a brief overview of the competing theories about 
the kind of right guaranteed by the Second Amendment:  the “individual 
right” theory as opposed to the “collective right” theory.  The different 
theories’ names are somewhat misleading; as Justice John Paul Stevens 
explains, though the Second Amendment clearly guarantees some sort of 
 
 67. See id. at 139; see also HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 84–86 (discussing 
congressional debate over the religious exemption clause of the proposed amendment).  
Finkelman notes, however, that the Senate kept no written records of its debates and the 
House did not spend much time debating this amendment at all. See Finkelman, supra note 
28, at 139. 
 68. See HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 86. 
 69. See id. at 88.  Halbrook notes that “attempts to strengthen recognition of state rights 
over militias and to proscribe standing armies would fail.” See id.  Halbrook also observes, 
“Amendments mandating avoidance of standing armies were rejected.” See id.  As was a 
proposal “[t]hat each state respectively shall have the power to provide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to 
provide for the same.” JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 126 (New York, Thomas Greenleaf, 1789); see also HALBROOK, supra note 29, 
at 88. 
 70. See HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 88 (explaining that some clauses were removed to 
eliminate redundancy, while the religious exemption might have been left out “to preclude 
any constitutional authority of the government to ‘compel’ individuals (even those without 
religious scruples) to bear arms for any purpose”); see also JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION 
OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 69, at 104 (recording the fifth 
proposed Amendment presented to the House on August 24, 1789, to read, “A well regulated 
militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed, but no one religiously scrupulous 
of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person”).  Halbrook argues 
The Senate’s deletion of the well-recognized definition of ‘militia’ as ‘the body of 
the people’ implied nothing more than its wish to be concise.  But its rejection of 
the proposal to limit the amendment’s recognition of the right to bear arms ‘for the 
common defence’ meant to preclude any limitation on the individual right to have 
arms, for example, for self-defense or hunting. 
HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 88–89 (citations omitted). 
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right that can be enforced by individuals, it is the scope of that right that is 
controversial.71 
According to the individual rights theory, the prefatory clause,72 or 
preamble, means that (1) a militia would better protect individual liberties 
than a standing army and (2) the people had a right to keep and bear arms 
for many purposes, including participation in such a militia.73  This 
perspective argues that the militia was seen by the Founders as “the 
ultimate democratic check on foreign policy, ensuring that only defensive 
wars will be fought.”74 
The First and Fourth Amendments similarly refer to “the people,” and 
those amendments have long been thought to confer individual rights.75  
Patrick Charles concedes “it would be a textual farce to interpret ‘people’ 
having one meaning in the First and Fourth Amendments and another in the 
Second Amendment.”76  If the Amendment were read only to confer the 
right to participate in a well-regulated militia, then Article I, Section 8 
would effectively place the control of militias in the hands of the federal 
government, exactly what the militias were meant to protect against.77  The 
collective rights theorist would reply that the Second Amendment was 
meant to counter Congress’ Article I, Section 8 power.78  Thus, under the 
collective rights theory, the right is better understood as restricting the 
power of Congress by providing for a well-regulated militia of the people.79  
The collective rights theorist would add that the Second Amendment was 
meant to be a restriction on Congress rather than on the states and their 
militias, evidenced by its placement in the Bill of Rights next to the First 
Amendment.80 
 
 71. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). But see Bogus, supra note 27, at 5 (describing how early court cases held that 
individuals were not able to enforce the Second Amendment right). 
 72. The text of the Second Amendment is usually separated into two clauses:  the 
prefatory and the operative clause. See PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT:  THE 
INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 5 (2009). 
 73. See DOHERTY, supra note 25, at 9. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. CHARLES, supra note 72, at 17. 
 77. See DOHERTY, supra note 25, at 10.  Article I, Section 8 provides in pertinent part: 
  The Congress shall have Power . . . .  To provide for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed 
in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the 
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to 
the discipline prescribed by Congress. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 78. See CHARLES, supra note 72, at 23–24 & n.50. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 15–16 (explaining that because “the First Amendment reads ‘Congress 
shall make no law . . . ,’ the [Second Amendment] was initially intended to be a restriction 
on Congress, not an individual right” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I) (emphasis added)).  
The First and Second Amendments were originally the Third and Fourth Articles, and the 
First and Second Articles also placed limits on Congress. See id. at 16.  “Thus, both 
individual right and collective right theorists have a legitimate argument that the 
amendment’s placement in the Bill of Rights supports their stance.” Id. at 17. 
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Discussing the interpretation of “bear arms,” Charles points out that 
eighteenth century colonial laws used the word “carry” to refer to civilian 
possession of arms, while “bear arms” referred to possession as part of 
military service, which “reinforce[s] an intended distinction between the 
words ‘bear’ and ‘carry.’”81  Further, reading the phrase “bear arms” in 
conjunction with the prefatory clause’s reference to a “well regulated 
militia” makes clear for the collective rights theorists that the phrase 
referred to military service.  This is especially so given that the Constitution 
was drafted by “America’s best legal and legislative minds,” meaning that 
the choice of “bear” and not “carry” is meaningful.82  Charles also argues 
that in the militia context, to “keep” is better understood to mean maintain 
rather than to own or possess.83 
Proponents of the individual rights theory point to nineteenth-century 
state court decisions and state legislative actions, in which the individual 
rights interpretation dominates.84  These decisions, the individual rights 
theorist would argue, conclusively show how the common understanding of 
the Second Amendment protected an individual’s right to keep and bear 
arms.85 
Before Heller, the Supreme Court had not reached a Second Amendment 
issue since its 1939 ruling in United States v. Miller.86  There, the Court 
asked whether the weapon at issue “has some reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” and concluded that 
because it did not, its regulation was not protected by the Second 
Amendment.87  The Court would not reach another Second Amendment 
challenge until 2008, nearly seventy years later. 
B.  The Decisions in Heller and McDonald 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held the District of 
Columbia’s prohibition on handgun possession to be an unconstitutional 
infringement on an individual’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms.88  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the Amendment’s 
text and subsequent treatment by courts and legislatures confirmed that it 
 
 81. See id. at 17–30. 
 82. See id. at 23. 
 83. See id. at 28. 
 84. See DOHERTY, supra note 25, at 11–13 (citing Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 
Litt.) 90, 91–92 (1822) (“[W]hatever restrains . . . the full and complete exercise of [the right 
to bear arms in defense of the citizens and the state], though not an entire destruction of it, is 
forbidden by the explicit language of the [Kentucky] constitution.”)). 
 85. See id. 
 86. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). But see David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court’s Thirty-Five 
Other Gun Cases:  What the Supreme Court Has Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99, 99 (1999) (examining Supreme Court decisions between Miller 
and Heller and concluding that the Court has indeed considered the right to keep and bear 
arms and found it to be an individual one). 
 87. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. But see Kopel, supra note 86 (arguing that Miller has been 
misunderstood and misapplied since it was decided). 
 88. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008). 
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protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms.89  In so holding, Justice 
Scalia rejected the “collective right” notion that the Second Amendment 
only protected the right to keep and bear arms as part of militia service.90  
The Court held that the Amendment’s prefatory clause merely “announces 
the purpose for which the right was codified:  to prevent elimination of the 
militia.”91  The prefatory clause does not, however, limit the scope of the 
right by “suggest[ing] that preserving the militia was the only reason 
Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more 
important for self-defense and hunting.”92  In this way, Justice Scalia’s 
interpretation of the operative clause to “guarantee the individual right to 
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation”93 is confirmed and 
supported by the prefatory clause.94 
The District of Columbia’s firearm code had several provisions at issue.  
First, it effectively banned handgun possession anywhere in the District of 
Columbia.95  Second, the code required individuals to keep other lawfully 
owned firearms “‘unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or 
similar device’” while in the home.96  Finally, the code prohibited carrying 
a handgun without a permit issued by the chief of police.97 
Ultimately, the Court held that the District of Columbia’s total ban on 
handgun possession was invalid because it prevented an individual from 
using “the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in 
the home,”98 a place “where the need for defense of self, family, and 
property is most acute.”99  Likewise, the Court held unconstitutional the 
code’s requirement that other guns be kept dissembled and unloaded in the 
home, because it “makes it impossible for citizens to use them for the core 
lawful purpose of self-defense.”100  Despite the District of Columbia’s 
argument that that requirement implicitly excepted use for self-defense, the 
Court found the statute’s language to preclude such an interpretation.101  
The Court did not reach analysis of the licensing requirement, as respondent 
Heller would presumably be eligible to license his handgun if the ban was 
struck down.102 
 
 89. See id. at 595. 
 90. See id. at 577–81. 
 91. Id. at 599. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 592. 
 94. See id. at 598. 
 95. Id. at 574–75 (characterizing the District of Columbia’s law as “generally 
prohibit[ing] the possession of handguns”); see also D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-
2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001). 
 96. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 575 (quoting D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02). 
 97. See D.C. CODE §§ 22-4504(a), -4506. 
 98. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
 99. Id. at 628. 
 100. Id. at 630. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. at 630–31. 
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The Court made clear that the right to keep and bear arms is neither 
unlimited nor unqualified.103  Justice Scalia noted the continuing validity of 
many restrictions and prohibitions on the possession of firearms.104  In 
listing certain types of “longstanding prohibitions,” Justice Scalia made 
clear that the Court was only providing examples of lawful regulatory 
measures rather than a comprehensive list.105  The Court interpreted its 
1939 holding in United States v. Miller to be consistent with its Heller 
holding, insofar as the Miller decision upheld a lawful limitation on the 
right to keep and bear arms not “in common use at the time.”106  Justice 
Scalia found that limitation to be “fairly supported by the historical tradition 
of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.”107 
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second 
Amendment’s protections against action by states and municipalities.108  
Relying in large part on its exploration of the history of the right to keep 
and bear arms in Heller two years earlier, the Court found that the right was 
so fundamental as to warrant incorporation by the Due Process Clause.109 
Until the Court’s decision in McDonald, the majority of lower courts had 
held the Second Amendment’s protections inapplicable to the states.110  
 
 103. See id. at 626–27. 
 104. See id. (“[N]othing in [the Court’s] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or 
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”). 
 105. See id. at 627 & n.26. 
 106. See id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).  For a 
critique of the potential application of the “common use standard” by post-Heller courts, see 
Nicholas J. Johnson, Administering the Second Amendment:  Law, Politics, and Taxonomy, 
50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1263 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson, Administering] and Nicholas J. 
Johnson, The Second Amendment in the States and the Limits of the Common Use Standard, 
(Fordham Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 1722955, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1722955 [hereinafter Johnson, Common 
Use]. 
 107. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DOHERTY, supra 
note 25, at 109 (“The Miller precedent was about the type of weapon, not the people to 
whom the right accrued.”). 
 108. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
 109. See id. at 3042 (“[I]t is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights 
necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Second 
Amendment’s ‘right to keep and bear arms’ imposes a limitation on only federal, not state, 
legislative efforts.”), abrogated by McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020; Edwards v. City of 
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 252 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he law is settled in our circuit that the 
Second Amendment does not apply to the States.”), abrogated by McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 
3020; Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 731 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“Until such time as Cruikshank and Presser are overturned, the Second Amendment limits 
only federal action, and . . . stays the hand of the National Government only.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)), abrogated by McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020. But see Nordyke v. 
King, 563 F.3d 439, 448, 457 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that although Fresno Rifle held that 
the Second Amendment was not incorporated to the states through the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the 
Second Amendment and applies it against the states and local governments”). 
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These lower courts relied in part on the precedents of Presser v. Illinois111 
and United States v. Cruikshank,112 which held that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the 
Second Amendment to the states or municipalities.113  Thus, lower courts 
did not often have occasion to analyze the scope of Second Amendment 
protections as applied to state and municipal gun regulations.114 
C.  Limiting the Right To Keep and Bear Arms 
In noting that Heller should not be read to invalidate certain 
“longstanding prohibitions,”115 Justice Scalia acknowledged the substantial 
history of state and municipal gun regulations since the eighteenth century.  
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller discusses nineteenth century state court 
cases describing the individual right conferred by the Second Amendment, 
but in the context of restrictions placed on the exercise of that right or the 
people to whom the right extends.116  This section examines characteristics 
of firearm restrictions today and provides a framework for categorizing and 
analyzing those restrictions. 
1.  Categories of Regulatory Choices 
To better understand courts’ distinct challenges and treatment of different 
kinds of regulatory choices, it is helpful to separate these choices into 
categories to compare lower court decisions across similar regulatory 
choices.  It is important to remember, however, that these categories often 
overlap.  Similarly, courts are not often transparent or explicit in their 
characterization of the challenged restriction or how that characterization 
ultimately influences the court’s analysis.  Nonetheless, it is valuable to 
 
 111. 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
 112. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
 113. See DOHERTY, supra note 25, at 14–15. 
 114. See, e.g., Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Since we 
hold that the second amendment does not apply to the states, we need not consider the scope 
of its guarantee of the right to bear arms.  For the sake of completeness, however, . . . we 
briefly comment on what we believe to be the scope of the second amendment.”), abrogated 
by McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020.  Lower courts did, however, have occasion to examine the 
scope of Second Amendment protections when deciding whether federal gun regulations 
infringed that right. See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(“[The Second Amendment] protects the right of individuals, including those not then 
actually a member of any militia or engaged in active military service or training, to 
privately possess and bear their own firearms . . . that are suitable as personal, individual 
weapons and are not of the general kind or type excluded by Miller.”). 
 115. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
 116. See id. at 611–14 (citing Waters v. State, 1 Gill 302, 309 (Md. 1843) (discussing free 
blacks as a “dangerous population” who cannot lawfully bear arms); Aymette v. State, 21 
Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840) (holding that the Tennessee state constitutional right to bear arms 
did not preclude a ban on concealed weapons); United States v. Sheldon, 5 Blume Sup. Ct. 
Trans. 337, 346 (Mich. 1829) (discussing the right to keep and bear arms as not “granted by 
the constitution for an unlawful or unjustifiable purpose”); Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 
Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449 (1824) (holding that certain constitutional rights, including the 
right to bear arms, did not extend to free blacks). 
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separate different restrictions because their interactions with the Second 
Amendment’s core protections should lead to different analyses. 
Restrictions can be placed in the following general categories:  
(1) prohibitions based on an individual’s characteristics;117 (2) prohibitions 
of specific devices; (3) “time, place, and manner”118 restrictions on 
possession; and (4) “frictional” regulations that add time, cost, or difficulty 
to the process of obtaining and keeping a firearm.119  Lower courts treat 
regulations in different categories differently, depending in part on the 
extent to which the “core” of the Second Amendment protections is 
burdened.120  Whether the Second Amendment’s protections extend outside 
the home or to purposes beyond self-defense is an open question for most 
courts,121 as is the question of the extent to which those protections 
diminish as they move further from the “core” protections discussed in 
Heller. 
a.  “Who” Restrictions 
Governments often restrict who is allowed to purchase, register, and 
possess a firearm.  The Heller decision noted the examples of prohibitions 
on possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, cautioning that 
these restrictions should still be “presumptively lawful.”122  Through 
membership in a certain group or by exhibiting a certain characteristic, an 
individual can be seen either as forfeiting the right or never accruing the 
right in the first place. 
Sitting en banc, the Seventh Circuit upheld a federal law making it a 
crime for individuals convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors to carry 
 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639–45 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(explaining that “some categorical limits are proper,” and upholding a federal statute 
prohibiting those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from carrying firearms). 
 118. Jeff Golimowski, Note, Pulling the Trigger:  Evaluating Criminal Gun Laws in a 
Post-Heller World, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1599, 1616–18 (2012). 
 119. See Johnson, Administering, supra note 106, at 1273. 
 120. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470–71 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[A]ny law 
that would burden the ‘fundamental,’ core right of self-defense in the home by a law-abiding 
citizen would be subject to strict scrutiny.  But, as we move outside the home, firearm rights 
have always been more limited, because public safety interests often outweigh individual 
interests in self-defense.”). But see Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“A blanket prohibition on carrying gun[s] in public prevents a person from defending 
himself anywhere except inside his home; and so substantial a curtailment of the right of 
armed self-defense requires a greater showing of justification than merely that the public 
might benefit on balance from such a curtailment . . . .”). 
 121. See Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (“What we 
know from [Heller and McDonald] is that the Second Amendment guarantees are at their 
zenith within the home. What we do not know is the scope of that right beyond the home and 
the standards for determining when and how the right can be regulated by a government.” 
(citation omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). But see Moore, 702 F.3d at 942 
(“The Supreme Court has decided that the [Second A]mendment confers a right to bear arms 
for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.”). 
 122. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
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arms.123  In doing so, the court discussed “categorical limits on the 
possession of firearms” and interpreted Heller to support some such limits 
generally, especially in the context of “persons who have been shown to be 
untrustworthy with weapons.”124  Another common example of “who” 
restrictions are state licensing schemes that exclude nonresidents from the 
licensing process.125 
b.  Device Restrictions 
Device restrictions seek to prohibit the possession or ownership of 
certain firearms, ammunition, or parts of firearms based on different 
characteristics.126  This category is exemplified by assault weapons bans in 
many states that outlaw certain types of firearms based on shared 
characteristics.127  One common criticism of device bans is that they tend to 
prohibit firearms with certain characteristics unrelated to their actual or 
potential dangerousness.128 
c.  Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 
Time, place, and manner restrictions place limits on the possession or use 
of firearms in certain locations and during certain situations.  This category 
is drawn from the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence129 and is often 
 
 123. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any 
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to . . . possess any firearm or 
ammunition.”). 
 124. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641.  The Skoien court went on to say that “Heller did not 
suggest that disqualifications would be effective only if the statute’s benefits are first 
established by admissible evidence.” Id.  Instead, categorical limits on certain classes of 
people could be upheld under Heller as substantially related to the government’s objective in 
preventing public harm. See id. at 641–42. 
 125. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-203(1)(a) (2013) (stating that permits for 
concealed carry of handguns are only available for legal Colorado residents); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 400.00(3)(a) (McKinney 2014) (excluding nonresidents without in-state employment 
from application process). 
 126. See generally Johnson, Common Use, supra note 106, at 5 (discussing problems with 
applying Heller’s “common use” standard to “functionally common” subcategories of 
firearm characteristics of ballistics, ammunition feeding, dimensions, and ammunition type). 
 127. See, e.g., People v. Zondorak, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 491, 493  (Ct. App. 2013) (rejecting 
a challenge to California’s Assault Weapons Control Act, codified at CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 30605 (2011)). 
 128. See Johnson, Administering, supra note 106, at 1266–67. 
 129. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“Our cases make 
clear . . . that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on 
the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288, 293 (1984))). 
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referred to explicitly by lower courts when deciding Second Amendment 
challenges.130 
In Doe v. Wilmington Housing Authority, the district court upheld a 
challenge to a restriction on possession of firearms in common areas of 
certain public housing complexes.131  There, the regulation at issue 
prohibited displaying or carrying a firearm in common areas, but provided 
an exception for the transport of a firearm to or from a resident’s unit.132 
d.  Frictional Restrictions 
“Frictional” restrictions add time, cost, or difficulty to the process of 
obtaining and keeping a firearm.133  This category commonly includes 
mandatory waiting-periods,134 licensing and application schemes,135 and 
fees for registration or licensing.136  In Kwong v. Bloomberg, for example, 
 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining 
that although the Supreme Court did not provide reasoning for why certain longstanding 
restrictions were permissible, “the natural explanation is that time, place and manner 
restrictions may not significantly impair the right to possess a firearm for self-defense, and 
may impose no appreciable burden on Second Amendment rights”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
838 (2013); Pineiro v. Gemme, 937 F. Supp. 2d 161, 174 (D. Mass. 2013) (analogizing a 
Massachusetts state licensing decision that restricted an individual’s permit for sport and 
hunting uses to a time, place, and manner restriction for permits for public gathering in the 
First Amendment context). But see Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. 12-cv-03288-WHO, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128435, at *25–26 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013) (declining to apply First 
Amendment concepts such as time, place, and manner jurisprudence in the context of a gun 
store that “does not have the expressive characteristics that allow for this sort of content-
based analysis”). 
 131. See Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d 513, 535–37 (D. Del. 2012), 
appeal docketed, No. 12-3433 (3d Cir. Aug. 27, 2012).  This case is currently on appeal to 
the Third Circuit.  Before deciding the appeal, the Third Circuit certified a question to the 
Delaware Supreme Court regarding the proper scope of the Delaware Constitution’s 
protections of the right to keep and bear arms. See Order Requesting Certification of State 
Law to Supreme Court, Wilmington Hous. Auth., No. 12-3433 (3d Cir. July 18, 2013).  Just 
recently, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Delaware Constitution offers broader 
protections than the Second Amendment and that the restriction on possession in common 
areas could not survive intermediate scrutiny. Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., No. 403, 
2014 Del. LEXIS 122, at *22–24, *29–33 (Mar. 18, 2014).  The Delaware Supreme Court 
explained that “the scope of the protections [the Delaware Constitution] provides are not 
limited to the home” and that the restriction at issue “severely burdens the right by 
functionally disallowing armed self-defense in areas that [r]esidents, their families, and 
guests may occupy as part of their living space.” Id. at *22, *33. 
 132. See Wilmington Hous. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d at 519–20. 
 133. See Johnson, Administering, supra note 106, at 1273. 
 134. See, e.g., Silvester v. Harris, No. 1:11-CV-2137, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172946, at 
*5–10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2013) (denying the defendant California’s motion for summary 
judgment, because a California law that imposed at least a ten-day waiting period between 
purchase and delivery of a firearm would pass rational basis review but was not likely to 
pass intermediate scrutiny). 
 135. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1), (3)(a) (McKinney 2014) (requiring an 
applicant for a license to carry a pistol or revolver to demonstrate, among other things, 
residency, citizenship, and good moral character).  In addition, § 400.00(4) provides that an 
applicant must undergo an investigation by the local police authorities of the accuracy of his 
application.  All of these requirements add time and cost to the process of applying for a 
firearm license. 
 136. See, e.g., Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 161 (2d Cir. 2013). 
2014] REGULATING THE MILITIA WELL 3501 
the Second Circuit upheld a New York City law, which required residents 
to pay a $340 licensing fee for a three-year license to possess a handgun.137  
Frictional restrictions may be analyzed similarly to time, place, and manner 
restrictions, but they can be differentiated because they typically add time 
or cost to possession regardless of location or manner of use.138 
2.  Categories of Justifications for Restrictions 
This section will discuss four categories of justifications for restrictions.  
Eugene Volokh argues that courts should separate challenged restrictions 
into categories based on the government’s justification for such a 
restriction, rather than applying one level of scrutiny indiscriminately.139  
State and local governments’ justifications for firearms restrictions 
generally fall into one or more of four categories:  (1) the restricted conduct 
is not within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections; (2) the 
restriction does not burden the right to keep and bear arms enough to rise to 
the level of infringement; (3) even if the restriction imposes a significant 
burden on the exercise of that right, it is justified by a significant reduction 
in harm to the public; and (4) the government is acting in its proprietary 
capacity as a landlord or employer, rather than as a sovereign, and its 
authority is greater to regulate conduct.140  These categories are analytically 
useful because it is inappropriate, for example, to apply the same level of 
exacting scrutiny to a restriction that only slightly burdens the right as to a 
restriction that severely burdens that right.141  In addition, these categories 
help to analogize between restrictions across different cases.142 
 
 
 137. Id.  New York sets a $3 to $10 range for such a fee elsewhere in the state, but allows 
New York City and Nassau County to set their own fees outside of this range. N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 400.00(14).  The Second Circuit upheld this provision against an Equal Protection 
challenge as well. See Kwong, 723 F.3d at 169–72. 
 138. But see United States v. Gonzalez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127121, at *23 (D. Utah 
Nov. 2, 2011) (describing a $200 tax on firearm registration as a time, place, and manner 
restriction that did not impose a significant burden on the exercise of Second Amendment 
rights). 
 139. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense:  
An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1446 (2009). 
 140. Id. at 1446–47. 
 141. See id. at 1447. 
 142. See id.  A prohibition on possession by minors could be justified by a scope 
argument, as constitutional rights have historically been limited when extended to minors.  A 
prohibition on possession by eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, however, would fall within the 
scope of the right, but could be justified because restricting that population’s ownership 
would reduce public harm.  Thus, even though both of these prohibitions are age-based 
restrictions on who can own firearms, their justifications are very different and it may not be 
helpful to analogize between the two.  If, however, the ban on possession by minors is also 
justified by its reduction of public harm, then its argument would be more broadly 
applicable. See id. at 1447, 1512. 
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a.  Scope 
A restriction may be justified because it restricts behavior or individuals 
that are not covered by the protected right as understood by “the 
constitutional text, the original meaning, or our understanding of 
background constitutional norms.”143  The scope of the Second Amendment 
right is, of course, contested,144 but some arguments are easier to make than 
others.  “Who” restrictions, for example, are often justified because they 
restrict individuals to whom the constitutional right is not commonly 
thought to extend,145 or individuals who are seen to have forfeited the 
right.146 
b.  Burden 
According to Volokh, the majority opinion in Heller can be seen as 
invalidating the District of Columbia’s ban because it was an impermissibly 
harsh burden on the exercise of the core Second Amendment right.147  
Because Americans overwhelmingly choose handguns as their weapon for 
self-defense, a total ban on handguns is an unconstitutional burden on the 
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home, even if the 
possession of other firearms remains legal.148 
For example, the Second Circuit analyzed a challenge to a licensing fee 
in terms of the burden it imposed on an individual’s exercise of the Second 
Amendment right.149  Because the court found that the licensing fee did not 
impose a substantial burden as applied to the plaintiffs, it applied 
intermediate scrutiny to decide whether the burden imposed was 
constitutional.150 
 
 143. Id. at 1449. 
 144. See supra Part I.A. 
 145. See Volokh, supra note 139, at 1453 (discussing, for example, minors who have 
limited constitutional rights to sexual autonomy, the right to marry, or the right to abortion). 
 146. See Golimowski, supra note 118, at 1615–16 (discussing how felons are subject to 
forfeiture of certain constitutional rights, including even the right to vote); see also Volokh, 
supra note 139, at 1452 (discussing prisoners, for example, who forfeit many constitutional 
rights including many First and Fourth Amendment rights). 
 147. See Volokh, supra note 139, at 1456–57. 
 148. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (“[B]anning from 
the home the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection of one’s 
home and family . . . fail[s] constitutional muster.” (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 
478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007))). 
 149. See Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 167–69 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 150. See id. at 167–68 (“[H]eightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions that 
(like the complete prohibition on handguns struck down in Heller) operate as a substantial 
burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess and use a firearm for self-defense (or 
for other lawful purposes) . . . .  [T]he fact that the licensing regime [in this case] makes the 
exercise of one’s Second Amendment rights more expensive does not necessarily mean that 
it ‘substantially burdens’ that right.” (quoting United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 
(2d Cir. 2012))). 
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c.  Danger Reduction 
Even when the restriction at issue falls within the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s protections, governments can justify a burden on the right to 
keep and bear arms by showing that it is aimed at reducing some public 
harm.151  In this category, courts often use traditional levels of scrutiny to 
evaluate whether the restriction properly serves the goal of reducing some 
danger to the public.152  In Osterweil v. Bartlett,153 for example, the court 
applied intermediate scrutiny to a New York licensing scheme that excluded 
nonresidents.154  In doing so, the court noted that New York state could 
better ensure the public safety of its citizens “[b]y limiting handgun licenses 
to those people who have the greatest contacts with New York.”155 
d.  Government As Proprietor 
Some restrictions may be justified because the government is acting in a 
different role, not as a sovereign but as a proprietor.156  Rather than using 
its sovereign power to regulate private conduct, the government may act as 
a landowner or an employer, for example.157  This distinction is more fully 
developed in other contexts,158 but it may still prove useful in the context of 
firearm regulations.  Volokh points out that this distinction often makes 
sense to “give the government more power when it comes to accomplishing 
its democratically determined goals on its property and with its wage 
payments, and to keep this power from bleeding over to controls of private 
citizens’ behavior on private property.”159  Volokh goes on to argue, 
however, that some government property, such as parks or public housing, 
might not warrant increased deference to government-as-proprietor 
restrictions.160 
 
 151. See Volokh, supra note 139, at 1461 (“The real inquiry is into whether and when a 
right may be substantially burdened in order to materially reduce the danger flowing from 
the exercise of the right, and into what sort of proof must be given to show that the 
substantial restriction will indeed reduce the danger.”). 
 152. See id. (“Courts sometimes . . . say[] that a constitutional right may be restricted 
when the restriction is necessary to serve a compelling government interest, or is 
substantially related to an important government interest.”). 
 153. 819 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 154. See id. at 84–86. 
 155. See id. at 85 (“[T]he law allows the government to monitor its licensees more closely 
and better ensure the public safety.”). But see Volokh, supra note 139, at 1514–15 (arguing 
that the distinction between citizens and aliens is better understood as a scope justification, 
since it stems from an interpretation of “the people” as including noncitizens). 
 156. See Volokh, supra note 139, at 1473. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. at 1473–74 (discussing examples where the government can more 
significantly regulate the private behavior of its employees, tenants, or people entering 
government-owned land, especially in the First Amendment context). 
 159. See id. at 1474. 
 160. See id. at 1475. 
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II.  A ROCKY ROAD AFTER HELLER 
This Part explores recent case law deciding challenges to firearm 
restrictions.  It describes several loose frameworks of analysis applied by 
courts in the wake of Heller and McDonald and offers an overview of the 
kinds of restrictions that have been upheld.  It then summarizes several 
competing and sometimes contradictory accounts of the post-Heller 
regulatory landscape. 
A.  What Has Happened Since Heller in the Lower Courts? 
This section provides an overview of the lower court cases that have 
heard challenges to state and local gun regulations since McDonald made 
Heller applicable to the states.  Since Heller and McDonald, many courts 
have struggled to apply the holding in Heller to firearms regulations that 
might not rise to the level of the total ban seen in the District of Columbia 
and in Chicago.161  Beyond the narrow scope of Heller’s holding, lower 
courts and regulators encounter a terra incognita as to how far the Second 
Amendment’s protections extend beyond the home and beyond the self-
defense context and as to what burdens will be upheld as constitutional 
exercises of government power.162  In the past several years, there has been 
a flood of literature concerning these questions.163  Some of the literature 
and lower court decisions have incorporated aspects of First Amendment 
jurisprudence into their analysis.164 
 
 161. See, e.g., Osterweil v. Bartlett, 819 F. Supp. 2d 72, 81–82 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The 
Supreme Court . . . identified a non-exclusive, illustrative list of constitutionally permissible 
restrictions on the Second Amendment, but declined to clarify the class of appropriate 
restrictions other than ‘longstanding prohibitions’ on the right to keep and bear arms.  This 
uncertainty has led to a deluge of litigation concerning the intersection of the individual right 
to keep and bear arms as defined by Heller and various firearms restrictions.”). But see Ezell 
v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 700 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that although Heller did not 
answer every question, courts are not “without a framework for how to proceed”). 
 162. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing the 
“dilemma faced by lower courts in the post-Heller world:  how far to push Heller beyond its 
undisputed core holding” and concluding that “[t]he whole matter strikes us as a vast terra 
incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small degree”). 
 163. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right To Carry Guns Outside the 
Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225 (2008); Stephen G. Gilles & Nelson Lund, Mandatory 
Liability Insurance for Firearm Owners:  Design Choices and Second Amendment Limits, 14 
ENGAGE:  J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 18 (2013); Andrew R. Gould, Note, The 
Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 1535 (2009); Michael J. Habib, Note, The Future of Gun Control Laws Post-McDonald 
and Heller and the Death of One-Gun-Per-Month Legislation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1339 
(2012). 
 164. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right to 
free speech, an undeniably enumerated fundamental right, is susceptible to several standards 
of scrutiny, depending upon the type of law challenged and the type of speech at issue.  We 
see no reason why the Second Amendment would be any different.” (citation omitted)); 
Justice v. Town of Cicero, 827 F. Supp. 2d 835, 842–43 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment fee jurisprudence in upholding a firearms registration 
fee, because the fee was designed to defray costs), aff’d, 468 F. App’x 642 (7th Cir. 2012); 
see also Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s “Schools” and 
“Government Buildings,” 92 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
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1.  Two-Pronged Approach or One-Pronged Approach? 
Analyzing challenges to firearms restrictions, many lower courts have 
adopted a two-pronged approach.165  First, a court will “ask whether the 
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the 
Second Amendment’s guarantee.”166  Second, if the law does impose a 
burden within the scope of the right, the court will apply some level of 
means-ends scrutiny.167 
Most courts agree that the appropriate degree of scrutiny should depend 
“on the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the 
challenged law burdens the right.”168  Restrictions that burden the core of 
the Second Amendment right as described in Heller receive strict scrutiny, 
while restrictions that do not impinge on the core but nonetheless burden 
the right receive more lenient scrutiny.169  The first prong of the approach 
looks most like an inquiry into whether the restriction falls within the scope 
of the Second Amendment right.170  Although courts may use language that 
suggests a burden inquiry,171 the first prong asks whether the restriction 
“regulates conduct that falls within the scope of the Second 
Amendment.”172  Courts have struggled with this first inquiry, as it requires 
them to formulate some boundaries of the right deliberately left unclear in 
Heller.173  Different courts have emphasized different approaches to 
navigating this as yet uncharted territory.174 
In formulating the two-pronged approach, the court in United States v. 
Marzzarella read Heller’s list of restrictions to be “presumptively lawful” 
because they fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment guarantee.175  
In Marzzarella, the court upheld a federal prohibition on firearms with 
 
 165. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 
700 F.3d 185, 197 (5th Cir. 2012) (adopting the two-step inquiry because it “comports with 
the language of Heller”), cert. denied, No. 13-137, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 1558 (Feb. 24, 2014). 
 166. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. 
 167. See id. 
 168. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010); accord Nat’l Rifle 
Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195. 
 169. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195. 
 170. See supra Part I.C.2.a. 
 171. See, e.g., Powell v. Tompkins, 926 F. Supp. 2d 367, 387 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 172. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 173. See, e.g., id. at 92 (“Heller did not purport to fully define all the contours of the 
Second Amendment, and accordingly, much of the scope of the right remains unsettled.  
While the Second Amendment clearly protects possession for certain lawful purposes, it is 
not the case that all possession for these purposes is protected conduct.” (citation omitted)). 
 174. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 194 (“To determine whether a law impinges on the 
Second Amendment right, we look to whether the law harmonizes with the historical 
traditions associated with the Second Amendment guarantee.”). But see United States v. 
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“The better 
approach is to acknowledge the limits of the scope inquiry in a more straightforward way:  
The historical evidence is inconclusive at best.”). 
 175. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (discussing an alternative reading of the Heller list 
as suggesting that those restrictions were presumptively lawful because they would satisfy 
some sort of means-ends scrutiny, but ultimately finding the scope reading a better one). 
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obliterated serial numbers.176  Applying the first prong, the court inquired 
as to whether the restriction regulated conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment.  In so doing, the court read Heller’s list of presumptively 
lawful regulations “to leave intact additional classes of restrictions.”177  The 
court reasoned that although Heller listed historical prohibitions, “it is not 
clear that pre-ratification presence is the only avenue to a categorical 
exception.”178  The court found unconvincing the argument that firearms 
without serial numbers were a categorically protected type of weapon 
because serial numbers were not contemplated during the Founding era.179  
The court acknowledged, however, that although firearms without serial 
numbers do not receive categorical protection, the restriction at issue might 
still place a burden on the core of the Second Amendment right—the right 
to self-defense in the home.180 
The Marzzarella court was ultimately reluctant to decide whether the 
restriction fell within the scope of the Second Amendment and found that 
because it passed intermediate or strict scrutiny, it was nonetheless 
constitutional.181  Analogizing to the First Amendment context, the court 
explained that enumerated rights are subject to different levels of scrutiny 
depending on the type of restriction and the type of conduct being 
burdened.182  The court proceeded to apply intermediate scrutiny,183 
concluding that the restriction at issue was far less restrictive than the 
handgun ban struck down in Heller and only sought to regulate “the manner 
in which persons may lawfully exercise their Second Amendment 
rights.”184  Applying intermediate scrutiny to the prohibition on firearms 
without original serial numbers, the court first found that the government’s 
asserted interest in assisting law enforcement in tracking weapons used in 
crimes to be a substantial or important interest.185  Next, the court found a 
 
 176. See id. at 101. 
 177. Id. at 92–93. 
 178. Id. at 93. 
 179. Id. at 93–94 (“It would make little sense to categorically protect a class of weapons 
bearing a certain characteristic when, at the time of ratification, citizens had no concept of 
that characteristic or how it fit within the right to bear arms.”). 
 180. Id. at 94. 
 181. See id. at 95. 
 182. See id. at 96–97 (“[T]he right to free speech, an undeniably enumerated fundamental 
right, is susceptible to several standards of scrutiny, depending upon the type of law 
challenged and the type of speech at issue.  We see no reason why the Second Amendment 
would be any different.” (citation omitted)). 
 183. The Marzzarella court described intermediate scrutiny as requiring that the asserted 
governmental interest be “either significant, substantial, or important,” and “the fit between 
the challenged regulation and the asserted objective be reasonable, not perfect.” Id. at 98 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Strict scrutiny, on the other hand, requires an asserted 
government interest that is “compelling” and a restriction that is “narrowly tailored” to 
achieve that compelling interest. Id. at 99.  “Narrow tailoring requires that the regulation 
actually advance the compelling interest it is designed to serve.  The law must be the least-
restrictive method of serving that interest, and the burdening of a significant amount of 
protected conduct not implicating the interest is evidence the regulation is insufficiently 
tailored.” Id. at 100 (citation omitted). 
 184. Id. at 97. 
 185. See id. at 98. 
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close fit between the restriction and the asserted interest because the statute 
only restricted possession of unmarked firearms.186 
Other courts have similarly declined to answer the first prong’s question 
of whether the burdened conduct falls within the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s guarantee.  In United States v. Decastro, the Second Circuit 
bypassed this inquiry altogether and held that heightened scrutiny is only 
appropriate for restrictions that substantially burden the exercise of the 
Second Amendment right.187  Because Heller emphasized just how 
burdensome the District of Columbia’s restrictions were throughout the 
decision, the Second Circuit reasoned that it is the degree of burden that 
should trigger the different levels of scrutiny.188  Under this rationale, the 
Second Circuit held that Heller does not “mandate that any marginal, 
incremental or even appreciable restraint on the right to keep and bear arms 
be subject to heightened scrutiny.”189  Instead, only those restrictions that 
place a substantial burden on that right should receive heightened 
scrutiny.190  The Second Circuit in Decastro found general support for this 
approach in several cases that applied the two-pronged approach more 
formally.191 
2.  Which Restrictions Have Survived Judicial Scrutiny? 
Many challenges to firearm restrictions have argued that the Heller 
decision offers protections for “the sorts of weapons protected . . . ‘in 
common use at the time.’”192  In deciding whether this phrase offers 
categorical protection to some firearms, courts have taken several different 
approaches.  In United States v. Chester, for example, the Fourth Circuit 
interpreted this phrase to support a broader proposition that the scope of the 
Second Amendment was limited by its historical understandings.193  A 
district court similarly read the common use passage to support the general 
proposition that the Second Amendment does not protect possession in 
 
 186. See id. at 99.  The court went on to explain that though it chose to apply intermediate 
scrutiny, the restriction at issue would pass strict scrutiny as well. See id.  The court found 
that the government’s interest in tracing firearm serial numbers was compelling because it 
helped law enforcement to prevent crime and collect “vital criminology statistics.” Id. at 99–
100.  The court also found that the restriction was narrowly tailored to achieve that end, as it 
“restricts possession only of weapons which have been made less susceptible to tracing.” Id. 
at 100–01. 
 187. See United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 838 (2013). 
 188. See id. at 165–68. 
 189. Id. at 166. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. (citing Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 
85, 94–95 (3d Cir. 2010)). But see Silvester v. Harris, No. 1:11-CV-2137, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 172946, at *6, *13–14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2013) (distinguishing the Second Circuit’s 
“substantial burden test” from the two-pronged approach, which the Ninth Circuit and a 
majority of other circuits had adopted). 
 192. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (quoting United States v. 
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
 193. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 676, 678–79 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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certain places, by certain people, or of certain weapons.194  In Marzzarella, 
the Third Circuit found unconvincing an argument that because firearms 
without serial numbers were “of the kind in common use” in 1791, they 
should be protected by the Second Amendment guarantee.195  The court did 
point out, however, that any categorical protections that firearms might 
enjoy under a concept of “common use” would be based on their functional 
characteristics.196  Even where a court indicated that the weapons at issue 
might be in common use, it upheld the restrictions because they would pass 
intermediate scrutiny even if within the Second Amendment’s scope.197 
Some courts have used the “common use” language to hold certain 
unusual and dangerous weapons outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s protections.  The Eighth Circuit, for example, took a more 
literal approach in holding that the Second Amendment did not protect 
possession of a machine gun.198  There, the court reasoned that because 
machine guns are not commonly used by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes, they fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment 
guarantee.199 
Lower courts have upheld state licensing schemes that tend to place a 
certain amount of discretion in the hands of the local law enforcement and 
judiciary.  In New Jersey, for example, a person must generally have a 
permit in order to carry a handgun in public.200  In order to acquire a 
permit, a person must demonstrate to local law enforcement that he or she 
(1) is not subject to any disqualifications such as mental illness or criminal 
 
 194. See Richardson v. United States, No. 3:08-1146, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25644, at 
*6–7 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2009) (“Thus, the Heller Court made clear that the Second 
Amendment right it recognized does not include possession of certain types of weapons, 
possession of weapons in certain places, or possession of weapons by certain categories of 
individuals, such as convicted felons.”). 
 195. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 624). 
 196. See id. at 94 (“[I]t also would make little sense to categorically protect a class of 
weapons bearing a certain characteristic wholly unrelated to their utility.  Heller 
distinguished handguns from other classes of firearms, such as long guns, by looking to their 
functionality.”). 
 197. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(“We think it clear enough in the record that semi-automatic rifles and magazines holding 
more than ten rounds are indeed in ‘common use,’ . . . .  Nevertheless . . . we cannot be 
certain whether these weapons are commonly used or are useful specifically for self-defense 
or hunting and therefore whether the prohibitions of certain semi-automatic rifles and 
magazines holding more than ten rounds meaningfully affect the right to keep and bear 
arms.”). 
 198. See United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 199. Id.; accord United States v. McCartney, 357 F. App’x 73, 76 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machine guns, 
silencers, grenades, or directional mines because they are not in common use and are 
dangerous and unusual); United States v. Tagg, 572 F.3d 1320, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that pipe bombs are not protected under the Second Amendment because they are 
not in common use); United States v. Perkins, No. 4:08CR 3064, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
72892, at *9–10 (D. Neb. Sept. 12, 2008) (holding that silencers or suppressors were 
similarly unprotected by the Second Amendment because they are not in common use by 
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes). 
 200. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5(b) (West 2013). 
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history, (2) is familiar with safe handling of firearms, and (3) can 
demonstrate a “justifiable need” to carry a handgun in public.201  
“Justifiable need” is defined as “the urgent necessity for self-protection, as 
evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a 
special danger to the applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by means other 
than by issuance of a permit to carry a handgun.”202 
In Drake v. Filko, the Third Circuit applied the two-pronged approach 
from Marzzarella to uphold the “justifiable need” requirement of the 
licensing scheme.203  The Drake court found that the justifiable need 
requirement fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment, because it is 
a “presumptively lawful” and “longstanding” restriction on firearm 
possession.204  Building on Marzzarella’s analysis, the Drake court 
reasoned first that New Jersey had required some sort of showing of need 
for a handgun license beginning in 1924.205  On a more general level, the 
court referred to Heller’s exceptions for longstanding regulations of 
concealed carry throughout the country’s history.206 
Though the court found it unnecessary to apply any level of means-ends 
scrutiny, it concluded that even if the justifiable need requirement fell 
within the scope of the Second Amendment, it would satisfy intermediate 
scrutiny.207  In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, the Second Circuit 
upheld a similar permitting scheme, where permits were issued only when 
an applicant can demonstrate (among other things) “proper cause.”208 
Lower courts have also consistently upheld age restrictions on the 
possession of firearms.  In Powell v. Tompkins, the court upheld a 
Massachusetts state licensing scheme that made it a crime to carry a firearm 
without a license and only issued licenses to persons over the age of twenty-
one.209  There, the court established that classification-based restrictions on 
firearms possession have enjoyed a long history, even predating the 
Founding era.210  The court found that age-based restrictions like the 
Massachusetts one at issue fell within that history.211  Applying the two-
pronged approach, the court thus held that the prohibition on possession by 
eighteen to twenty-one-year-olds imposed no burden within the scope of the 
Second Amendment’s protections.212 
 
 201. Id. § 2C:58-4(c). 
 202. N.J. ADMIN. CODE 13:54-2.4(d)(1) (2014). 
 203. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See id. at 432. 
 206. See id. at 432–33. 
 207. See id. at 430. 
 208. See Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). 
 209. Powell v. Tompkins, 926 F. Supp. 2d 367, 387–88 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 210. See id. at 387. 
 211. See id. (“The facts evinced from this quick jaunt through history establish that 
certain access-limiting conditions were and may lawfully be imposed upon individuals 
seeking to own and use firearms.  Age-based restrictions, enacted for reasons of public 
safety, are among those lawful impositions.”). 
 212. See id. 
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The Fifth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in National Rifle Ass’n v. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives.213  There, the court 
found that a federal restriction on access to and purchase of certain firearms 
by persons under the age of twenty-one most likely fell outside the scope of 
the Second Amendment guarantee, but even if it did not, it should be upheld 
under step two of the inquiry.214  Before proceeding to step two, however, 
the court analyzed Founding-era attitudes, concluding that minors (under 
the age of twenty-one) were understood to be excluded from the protections 
of the right to keep and bear arms, so the public would have supported a 
restriction on that population’s possession and access to firearms.215  The 
court proceeded to analyze nineteenth-century court decisions, legislative 
records, and commentators, again concluding that restricting access of 
persons under the age of twenty-one comports with a “longstanding, 
historical tradition.”216  According to the court, this longstanding tradition 
suggests that its proscriptions regulate conduct outside of the scope of the 
Second Amendment’s protections.217 
B.  Competing Accounts of the Post-Heller Landscape 
This section explores competing accounts of post-Heller decisions.  
Many see Heller as an opportunity for courts to better define the Second 
Amendment right and the framework of scrutiny to apply to challenges.218  
Other commentators, however, argue that Heller has actually opened the 
door for lower courts to enter into the gun control debate, which had been 
populated largely by academics and special interest groups.  Now that lower 
courts have a platform from which to analyze firearms regulations, 
deference to state and local legislative bodies may actually increase. 
1.  Judicial Restraint, Intermediate Scrutiny, and Deference 
Allen Rostron argues that Justice Stephen Breyer’s suggested approach in 
his Heller dissent is actually a better description of how lower courts have 
treated challenges to gun regulations since that decision.219  While courts 
have had little trouble applying some parts of Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion, other instructions have proved more difficult, leaving lower courts 
to proceed in a Breyer-like fashion.  First, Rostron points out that lower 
courts have consistently applied the majority’s instructions that the right to 
 
 213. 700 F.3d 185, 204 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1364 (2014). 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. at 202. 
 216. Id. at 203.  The court explained that the restriction at issue was consistent with that 
tradition both at a high level of generality, “targeting select groups’ ability to access and to 
use arms for the sake of public safety,” and more specifically with a history of “age- and 
safety-based restrictions.” Id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 14, at 2043 (“Subsequent litigation offers an 
opportunity . . . to educate lower courts about the choices they have and to offer the guidance 
the Court declined to provide about crafting rules that implement the guarantee Heller 
recognized.”). 
 219. See generally Rostron, supra note 7. 
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keep and bear arms only protects those who use them for legitimate, lawful 
purposes.220  Second, Rostron argues that lower courts have also had little 
trouble applying the majority’s instructions that the Second Amendment 
only protects those firearms in “common use” to restrictions on certain 
types of firearms.221 
Lower courts have run into more difficulty, however, in applying the 
majority’s identification of several examples of  “presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures.”222  Rostron explains that immediately after Heller, 
many challenges were brought to the federal ban on firearm possession for 
felons and were upheld because that prohibition was included in Justice 
Scalia’s “list” of presumptively lawful restrictions.223  In 2009, however, a 
Tenth Circuit judge pointed out that prohibiting felons from possessing 
firearms might originate in the twentieth century, and therefore not be so 
clearly “longstanding.”224  After this discussion, lower courts began to 
inquire more deeply into the historical tradition of felon-in-possession 
restrictions and into the specific characteristics of the felon seeking to 
possess a firearm.225  Rostron contends that because such historical 
inquiries inevitably produce unclear results, “courts ultimately decide what 
to do . . . based on assessments about sound public policy for modern-day 
America.”226 
Analyzing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Masciandaro, 
for example, Rostron finds that the court discussed extensively the 
presumptively lawful regulations discussed in Heller and how that decision 
should apply to the restriction possessing firearms in cars on national park 
property.227  Nonetheless, Rostron argues, the court ultimately upheld the 
conviction because “the government had sound reasons for regulating guns 
in ‘a national park area where large numbers of people, including children, 
 
 220. See id.  Rostron discusses how courts have consistently upheld statutes “prohibiting 
the use of firearms in furtherance of violent crimes or drug trafficking offenses” and 
sentencing enhancements for crimes committed with guns. See id. at 726.  These decisions 
are based in large part, Rostron argues, on the Court’s instruction that “the Second 
Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens 
for lawful purposes.” See id. at 711 (emphasis added) (quoting District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 221. See id. at 726–29.  Justice Scalia discussed “another important limitation on the right 
to keep and carry arms,” namely that the right only protects those firearms “in common use 
at the time.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (citation omitted).  Rostron argues that lower courts 
have followed these instructions by upholding restrictions on machine guns and short-
barreled shotguns, for example, though the courts often give little discussion as to what 
constitutes a firearm “in common use.” See Rostron, supra note 7, at 726–27. 
 222. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 n.26. 
 223. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 729.  Although these decisions deal with a federal 
statute, the shift in analysis and treatment that Rostron identifies exists in the context of 
challenged state and municipal restrictions as well. 
 224. See id. (discussing United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047–48 (10th Cir. 
2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring)). 
 225. See id. at 731–32. 
 226. Id. at 732.  Rostron notes that each challenge to the felon-in-possession statute has 
failed. See id. at 733. 
 227. See id. at 735–36 (discussing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 
2011)). 
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congregate for recreation.’”228  The approach in Masciandaro, Rostron 
argues, is repeated across other jurisdictions and is indicative of the 
approach of most courts after Heller.229 
Lower courts find the Heller decision even more difficult to apply in 
practice when faced with challenges to restrictions not explicitly mentioned 
in Justice Scalia’s opinion.230  First, Rostron notes that many state courts 
have decided to uphold any restriction not unequivocally invalidated by 
Heller and McDonald.231  This admittedly narrow reading of Heller and 
McDonald certainly makes evaluating gun restrictions short of the total 
bans in the District of Columbia and Chicago much simpler. 
According to Rostron, federal courts have been more reluctant to apply 
Heller’s holding so narrowly.232  He sees an evolution in courts’ treatment 
of challenges, beginning with the approach in United States v. Booker.233  
There, the district court upheld the federal statute prohibiting domestic 
violence misdemeanants from firearm possession, reasoning that it was 
analogous to the “longstanding” restriction on felon possession mentioned 
in Heller.234  If the justification for Heller’s list of presumptively valid 
restrictions is that they are good public policy because of their reduction of 
public harm,235 then the Booker court’s reasoning makes sense.236 
If Heller suggests, however, that those “longstanding” restrictions are 
justified because they are traditional limitations on the right to keep and 
bear arms, then lower courts should be engaging in a historical analysis 
rather than evaluating current public policy choices.237  Rostron argues that 
even the lower court decisions that purport to engage in such a historical 
 
 228. Id. at 736 (quoting Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 473). 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. at 736–37 (“[T]he Supreme Court provided an intriguing stew of different 
signals, rather than a single clear recipe, for lower courts taking on the work of 
implementing the right to keep and bear arms.”). 
 231. See id. at 737–38; see also, e.g., People v. Williams, 962 N.E.2d 1148, 1152 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2011) (“[T]he rulings in both Heller and McDonald made clear that the only type of 
firearms possession they were declaring to be protected under the second amendment was 
the right to possess handguns in the home for self-defense purposes.”); State v. Knight, 241 
P.3d 120, 133 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (“It is clear that the Court was drawing a narrow line 
regarding the violations related solely to use of a handgun in the home for self-defense 
purposes.  [The] . . . argument, that Heller conferred on an individual the right to carry a 
concealed firearm, is unpersuasive.”); Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md. 2011) (“If 
the Supreme Court . . . meant its holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need to 
say so more plainly.”).  Rostron points out that California, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, “with the exception of Kansas, . . . are deeply ‘blue’ 
(i.e., liberal) states that rank in the top ten on lists of states with the strictest gun laws and the 
lowest rates of firearm ownership.” Rostron, supra note 7, at 738–39. 
 232. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 739. 
 233. 570 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Me. 2008), aff’d, 644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011); Rostron, 
supra note 7, at 739–40. 
 234. See Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 163. 
 235. See supra Part I.C.2.c. 
 236. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 740. 
 237. See id. at 741. 
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analysis238 “ultimately . . . illustrat[e] how historical evidence is often 
indeterminate.”239  In challenges to prohibitions on possession by felons 
and certain misdemeanants, for example, Rostron points out that because 
felonies in the Founding era “were typically punishable by death and 
imprisonment for such offenses was rare” courts are reluctant to rely too 
heavily on historical and originalist arguments to analyze contemporary 
policy choices about felon possession of firearms.240  Courts confront 
similarly inconclusive historical evidence when analyzing challenges to 
other types of contemporary restrictions, and Rostron argues that in the end, 
most courts apply some type of balancing approach that is similar to 
intermediate scrutiny.241 
Thus, Rostron argues, most courts have instead applied the more familiar 
framework of tiers of scrutiny applied in other constitutional rights 
contexts.242  Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook’s en banc decision in United 
States v. Skoien exemplifies this approach, ultimately upholding the federal 
statute banning possession by domestic violence misdemeanants.243  Lower 
courts using this familiar framework, according to Rostron, share several 
important features that ultimately grant more deference to the legislative 
branches in their public policy determinations. 
First, how judges evaluate the government’s empirical claims of the 
effects of the firearms restrictions determines in large part how demanding 
the intermediate scrutiny will be.244  According to Volokh, if courts were to 
require “substantial scientific proof” for the government’s claims of danger 
reduction, courts would be striking down gun control laws left and right.245  
Such proof simply does not exist.246  Instead, Rostron argues that lower 
courts have followed Chief Judge Easterbrook’s lead and only require a 
 
 238. See, e.g., United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009).  Rostron describes 
Rene E. as a “quintessential example” of a lower court that engaged in a “strictly historical 
analysis” to find “a longstanding tradition supporting” a restriction on juvenile handgun 
access, thus upholding the restriction. Rostron, supra note 7, at 741. 
 239. Rostron, supra note 7, at 743. 
  [T]he answers that one derives from this sort of historical inquiry depends 
greatly on the level of generality of the questions asked.  If history proves that the 
Founding Fathers accepted the general idea of age restrictions on access to guns, 
perhaps that is all that should really matter, and the Founders’ more specific beliefs 
about an appropriate age limit should be ignored because times have changed since 
the eighteenth century. 
Id. at 742. 
 240. Id. at 750–51 (quoting United States v. Walker, 709 F. Supp. 2d 460, 466 (E.D. Va. 
2010)).  “In a time when a felony conviction was essentially a death sentence, the issue of 
whether a felon should have the right to keep and bear arms was nonsensical.” Id. at 751. 
 241. See id. at 752. 
 242. See id. at 744. 
 243. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Rostron, supra note 
7, at 744; see also supra notes 123–24, and accompanying text. 
 244. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 746 (citing Volokh, supra note 139, at 1467–70). 
 245. See Volokh, supra note 139, at 1467–68. 
 246. See id. at 1468; Rostron, supra note 7, at 747 (discussing how “[t]he research that 
exists simply is not capable of proving . . . one way or the other” whether gun control laws 
actually reduce harm and make citizens safer). 
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“strong showing”247 that the challenged restriction reasonably furthers an 
important government interest.248  Reducing gun violence and protecting 
public safety are clearly important government interests,249 and Rostron 
argues that lower courts find that restrictions further that interest based on 
logical arguments and conclusions, even in the absence of overwhelming 
empirical evidence.250 
Second, many courts have required a showing of a substantial burden251 
on the right to keep and bear arms before allowing a constitutional 
challenge to proceed to the intermediate scrutiny inquiry.252  This 
requirement, Rostron argues, acts as a gatekeeper to constitutional 
challenges to firearms restrictions, effecting even more deference to 
legislators.253  Thus, courts may theoretically require more than simply a 
plausible logical rationale for the reduction in public harm, but end up 
deferring to legislators by finding that the restriction does not rise to the 
level of a substantial burden on the Second Amendment right. 
Rostron acknowledges that there are several lower court decisions that 
seem to point in the opposite direction.  The Seventh Circuit, in Ezell v. City 
of Chicago, suggested that the highly deferential approach used in Skoien 
(and across the country) might not apply to restrictions that come closer to 
substantially burdening the core of the Second Amendment right.254  
Rostron argues, however, that this exception to the overall trend is 
decidedly a narrow one255 and that the majority of lower courts have 
eschewed the categorical and historical approach of Justice Scalia’s Heller 
opinion in favor of the approach laid out in Justice Breyer’s dissent.256  
 
 247. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641. 
 248. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 748. 
 249. See, e.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876–77 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997) (concluding that the 
offered government interests of “protecting public safety and preventing crime . . . are 
substantial”)). 
 250. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 748. But see Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (“The theoretical and empirical evidence (which overall is inconclusive) is 
consistent with concluding that a right to carry firearms in public may promote self-defense.  
Illinois had to provide us with more than merely a rational basis for believing that its 
uniquely sweeping ban is justified by an increase in public safety.  It has failed to meet this 
burden.”). 
 251. See supra Part II.C.2.b. 
 252. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 750 (“By requiring a threshold showing of a significant 
burden on the exercise of the right to keep and bear arms, courts reduce the number of 
constitutional claims that even reach the intermediate scrutiny stage where some showing of 
the challenged law’s probable effects is required.”). 
 253. See id. (“The sorting achieved by the substantial burden framework thus sensibly 
pushes more of the job of evaluating gun control laws away from judges and back to 
legislators.”). 
 254. See id. at 754 (citing Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
 255. See id. at 755 (“[I]t is remarkable to think that this . . . ruling that enables 
Chicagoans to travel a slightly shorter distance to firing ranges, is the most dramatic advance 
for gun rights made by the lower courts in the years since Heller.” (footnote omitted)). 
 256. See id. at 757 (“Struggling to work within the more categorical framework of 
decisionmaking favored by Justice Scalia, the lower courts have essentially wound up 
embracing the sort of interest balancing that Justice Breyer recommended and that Scalia 
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Lower courts since Heller have taken that decision and protected a right to 
keep and bear arms “that is broad but not particularly deep.”257 
2.  The “Common Use” Standard 
Nicholas Johnson argues that Heller stands for the idea that the Second 
Amendment protects “those firearms in ‘common use for lawful purposes 
like self-defense.’”258  The “common use standard” refers to “functionally 
common” firearms, that is, firearms that, regardless of their manufacturer, 
share certain characteristics.259  While this standard is problematic in many 
ways, Johnson maintains that it represents “the core test for determining the 
scope of the individual right to arms . . . articulated in [Heller]” with respect 
to device restrictions.260 
Johnson first argues that some restrictions should clearly fail under the 
common use standard and are thus vulnerable to constitutional 
challenges.261  Restrictions that require firearms to have certain product 
safety features, such as magazine safeties or integral trigger locks, are likely 
to be struck down because guns without these features are “undeniably 
common self-defense guns.”262  Similarly, a New Jersey statute that will 
restrict the sale of handguns without “smart gun”263 technology once that 
technology is commercially available should clearly fail under the common 
use standard, as “[o]rdinary handguns are widely used, and explicitly 
protected under Heller.”264 
Some restrictions are more difficult to analyze under the common use 
standard.  Johnson maintains that because of the “politics, mythology and 
 
vociferously denounced.”).  Rostron is careful to point out, however, that this may not be a 
deliberate move away from the majority’s holding, but merely a pragmatic shift when 
confronted with “the reality that historical inquiries are extremely difficult and do not 
produce determinate answers to the types of detailed questions that must be resolved 
concerning the wide range of gun laws and regulations in effect . . . throughout the country.” 
Id. at 756–57. 
 257. Id. at 762.  Although the right to keep and bear arms is now certainly broad enough 
to protect nonmilitia uses, lower courts applying some form of highly deferential 
intermediate scrutiny have proceeded with the utmost restraint. Id. 
 258. See Johnson, Common Use, supra note 106, at 4 (quoting District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 (2008)). 
 259. See id. 
 260. Johnson, Administering, supra note 106, at 1263; see also Michael S. Obermeier, 
Note, Scoping Out the Limits of “Arms” Under the Second Amendment, 60 KAN. L. REV. 
681, 700–01 (2012) (criticizing Heller’s common use standard for “basing an important 
constitutional right on the vicissitudes of popular opinion, rather than a consistent, objective 
standard”). 
 261. See Johnson, Administering, supra note 106, at 1264 (describing how the “common 
use standard gives straightforward answers to a number of questions”). 
 262. Id. at 1265. 
 263. “Smart gun” technology is a generic category referring to safety features that, among 
other things, prevent a gun from being unlocked unless by an identified user. See Michael S. 
Rosenwald, ‘We Need the iPhone of Guns’:  Will Smart Guns Transform the Gun Industry?, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/we-need-the-iphone-of-
guns-will-smart-guns-transform-the-gun-industry/2014/02/17/6ebe76da-8f58-11e3-b227-
12a45d109e03_story.html. 
 264. Johnson, Administering, supra note 106, at 1264. 
3516 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
symbolism” surrounding how firearms get categorized, the standard is more 
susceptible to manipulation and distortion.265  Johnson argues that because 
some of the characteristics and distinctions used to separate restricted from 
nonrestricted firearms are “mainly political or symbolic,” it is much more 
difficult for courts to meaningfully analyze how the common use standard 
might apply to those restrictions.266  Johnson predicts that this difficulty 
may manifest in pressure to uphold device restrictions that are less 
defensible under Heller’s common use standard.267  The real question that 
Heller poses, and that lower courts have yet to answer, is to what extent 
courts will accept these “taxonomical” manipulations as distinct 
categories.268 
Johnson points out that the common use standard will not assist lower 
courts in handling challenges to frictional restrictions.269  For these 
restrictions, Johnson suggests that the Court’s regulatory takings analysis 
may predict how lower courts will address challenges to frictional 
restrictions that add time, cost, or difficulty to the exercise of the Second 
Amendment right.270  Thus, restrictions that are so costly or time-
consuming as to nearly extinguish the right will be unconstitutional, while 
restrictions that impose minor burdens will be upheld.271 
III.  EVALUATING POST-HELLER ACCOUNTS 
This Part evaluates how the accounts that Rostron and Johnson offer 
measure against recent case law of lower courts.  It concludes that the 
confusion among lower courts more closely resembles Rostron’s account of 
judicial deference and interest balancing.  Though Johnson provides a 
logical and plausible route that lower courts may choose to follow in the 
future, decisions thus far have yet to lend support for this approach. 
First, Johnson is accurate in predicting that courts will sometimes 
evaluate challenges to device restrictions using a common use approach.272  
Courts have been most confident in applying the common use logic when 
 
 265. See id. at 1265–66. 
 266. See id. at 1266 (discussing how these political or symbolic distinctions “distort[] the 
delineation of legitimate substantive categories and complicates extrapolations from the 
common use standard”). 
 267. See id. at 1266–67 (discussing assault weapons as a category that “has undeniable 
political and symbolic resonance” such that “states, municipalities, and perhaps even courts 
will feel especially pressured to uphold those distinctions”).  Johnson worries “that lower 
courts will be tempted to diminish [Heller and McDonald] and the Supreme Court will 
respond or not depending on its political makeup at the time.” Id. at 1268. 
 268. See id. at 1272 (“The open question is how far courts will credit the fine distinctions 
that are necessary to maintain restrictions on particular categories of technology.  How small 
a difference in appearance, mechanics, or ballistics will sustain a separate regulated 
category?”). 
 269. See id. at 1273. 
 270. See id. at 1273–74. 
 271. See id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992), and Pa. 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), for the Court’s regulatory takings 
framework). 
 272. See supra notes 193–99 and accompanying text. 
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confronted with weapons that are clearly dangerous and unusual, and so 
have upheld those prohibitions that restrict firearms not in common use.273  
Even when confronted with the kinds of “easy fits” characterized by 
Johnson, however, courts have shied away from applying any sort of 
common use logic.  Instead, those courts decide to bypass the scope inquiry 
and uphold the challenged restrictions under some form of means-ends 
scrutiny without deciding whether the weapons at issue are protected under 
the Second Amendment.274 
Further, recent case law has not shown indications of the kind of 
manipulation of classifications of firearms Johnson has warned against.275  
For device restrictions that are not clearly constitutional under the simplest 
common use analysis, courts do not go through the trouble of applying a 
common use analysis.  Instead, courts have chosen to bypass this scope 
inquiry, assuming that the restrictions do proscribe protected conduct, and 
then proceed under some level of means-ends scrutiny.276 
This approach much more closely resembles Rostron’s argument that 
courts will uphold restrictions on dangerous and unusual weapons using the 
common use logic, while eschewing the same logic when confronted with 
less clearly unusual or dangerous weapons.277  While Johnson argues that 
the common use standard will provide gun rights proponents with the 
opportunity to challenge certain “easy fits,” the case law cuts the other 
way.278 
In addition, courts use Heller’s passage referring to those weapons in 
common use to support broader propositions about the scope of the Second 
Amendment right.279  Courts have interpreted the passage to lend general 
support for the existence of categorical exclusions to the Second 
Amendment guarantee (i.e., for certain uncommon weapons).280  Courts 
have also read the passage to support the idea that an inquiry into the scope 
of the Second Amendment’s protections should be historical in nature.281  
In this way, courts have simply read the common use passage to support the 
broader, interest-balancing inquiries that Rostron describes.282 
In the context of evaluating challenges to frictional restrictions, Johnson 
may be more accurate in his predictions.283  The district court’s order 
denying summary judgment to the government defendants in Silvester v. 
Harris may be an indication that courts will analyze more severe frictional 
restrictions like mandatory waiting periods differently.284  In Silvester, the 
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court denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, because a 
California law that imposed at least a ten-day waiting period between 
purchase and delivery of a firearm would pass rational basis review but was 
not likely to pass intermediate scrutiny.285  Though that court did not 
explicitly utilize a takings framework as Johnson suggested,286 the court 
was certainly taking a less deferential approach than Rostron would have 
predicted by actually scrutinizing the fit between the mandatory waiting 
period and the asserted government justifications.287 
The majority of court decisions since Heller, however, demonstrate that 
courts prefer to apply some sort of means-ends scrutiny rather than 
engaging in either a common use inquiry or a deeply historical analysis.288  
Within a framework of interest balancing and some form of means-ends 
scrutiny that does not require narrow tailoring, state and municipal 
regulators have enjoyed much greater deference than predicted by Johnson.  
It is too soon to tell whether less deferential recent opinions such as 
Silvester will survive appellate review.289  It is unlikely, however, that 
against the great weight of case law decided in favor of upholding firearms 
restrictions in the last five years, that decision will shift the trend away from 
deference and judicial restraint. 
CONCLUSION 
While Heller certainly may be “historic in its implications”290 for 
theoretical discussions of firearms regulations, lower courts have made 
clear that the Second Amendment right is “broad but not particularly 
deep.”291  Faced with confusing and contradictory signals from the 
Supreme Court, lower courts have retreated to the familiar territory of 
means-ends scrutiny.  In doing so, courts have upheld the vast majority of 
firearms regulations against challenges by gun rights proponents, so long as 
those regulations do not rise to the level of a total ban as seen in the District 
of Columbia and Chicago.  While it remains to be seen whether regulators 
will seize this trend as an opportunity to expand current restrictions up to 
(but not crossing) the line of a total ban, it is clear that courts have signaled 
their deference to state and local governments in this area. 
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